A JUDICIAL POSTSCRIPT TO THE CHURCH-STATE
DEBATES OF 1989: HOW POROUS THE WALL,
HOW CIVIL THE STATE?
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE*

I.

Since the presentation of the papers in this Symposium,
the Supreme Court has written still another decision pertinent
to its subject. In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union,' delivered on the last day of the 1988-89 Term, the
Court provided a strong clue as to where the debate now seems
to be headed. Some brief comment on that decision may serve
as an updating postscript to the principal papers presented
here. Judging by the quite polarized opinions written in County
ofAllegheny, we may yet be headed for more conflict, rather than
less. For the moment, a single justice, Justice O'Connor, holds
center stage. Formerly she has been most usually associated
quite closely with Chief Justice Rehnquist's views. Now, as
others had already seen in her earlier work, something is developing of a more independent course. Here, roughly speaking,
with every hope of encouraging the substantiality of the position she has come to represent, is how it momentarily plays out
on the current Court.
Justices Scalia and Kennedy have succeeded to the positions formerly held by Warren Burger and Lewis Powell
(allowing for Justice Rehnquist's move from his Associate Justice position to that of Chief Justice). Each of them, it now
seems reasonably clear, is uninterested in maintaining anything
even roughly like the rigor of the original Everson doctrine,2 the
doctrine that spoke for all nine Justices of the Supreme Court
when it first appeared four decades ago, in 1947. Neither of
the newest Justices seems to feel the pull of the Madison-Jefferson view of the first amendment, moreover, in nearly the
degree as did Justice Powell. With Justice Rehnquist now presiding as Chief Justice, and with Justice White roughly congenial to Justice Rehnquist's highly limited view of the
*
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1. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (quoted infra,
note 6).
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establishment clause-a limited view evidently shared by Justices Scalia and Kennedy as well-there is good reason to see
the Court as a Court generally divided four-to-four in a categorical, and not merely in a line-drawing, fashion.
Eight of the nine Justices are deadlocking over essentials,
and not simply over details. Here, quite equivalently to what
also appears to have occurred in the abortion field during this
last term of the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor holds crucial
ground.3 What is at stake, moreover, is more than her vote.
Rather, it is a question of her constitutional attitude that one is
most appropriately interested to understand. In County of Allegheny, it comes through quite distinctly and well. Overall,
moreover, for those inclined to think that Madison and Jefferson were substantially sound in the shared perspectives they
held of the first amendment-to maintain a civil government of
civil equals, fully to respect religious liberty but not to confuse
it with civil government-this most recent case is a sign of good
health.
County of Allegheny is a reprise on Lynch v. Donnelly.4 Like
Lynch, it, too, is decided by a vote of five-to-four. By this narrow majority, distinguishing the facts from those in Lynch, the
Court has held that where a municipality installs a complete
Nativity Scene inside its Hall of Justice, dominating the principal staircase with an unmistakable seriousness of physical presence and official endorsement, the city's subsidy, entanglement
and involvement have come finally too far.5
The controlling vote in the case was cast by Justice
O'Connor, affirming the lower court which had itself limited
the license of Lynch v. Donnelly, as nearly every other lower federal court had also done. To be sure, it is Justice Blackmun,
rather than Justice O'Connor, who writes the lead opinion
announcing the judgment of the Supreme Court in the County
of Alegheny case. He begins early on by quoting the strong and
familiar language from Everson v. Board of Education.6 He also
3.

109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).

4. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
5. However, the same case also holds (by a different five-to-four
majority of course) that the city's installation of a giant menorah furnished by
one Jewish sect, Chabad, immediately outside the city-county building a block
away, when accompanied by a giant Christmas tree furnished by the city, is all

right.
6. The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his
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invokes the implementing three-part Lemon test Professor
Esbeck has explored in his paper. 7 It is Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, lifted from Lynch v. Donnelly, however, that dominates even what Justice Blackmun writes.8 And it essentially
resonates to a principle both Madison and Jefferson shared.
The suggestion ventured by Justice O'Connor in Lynch,
and applied in County of Allegheny, is recalled in her separate
opinion in County of Allegheny, in the following way:
In my concurrence in Lynch, I suggested a clarification of
our Establishment Clause doctrine to reinforce the concept that the Establishment Clause "prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community....
[The establishment clause prohibits government from
sending] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community." 9
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. [In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between church and State."]
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). (The original closing
sentence from Everson appears here in brackets; in County of Allegheny, Justice
Blackmun dropped it out.)
7. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). According to this test, the
state action challenged on establishment clause grounds must reflect some
secular purpose, yield primarily a secular effect, and not involve undue
entanglement of government and religion. The latter two parts of that test
were deemed principally implicated in the County of Alegheny case.
8. See, e.g., 109 S.Ct. at 3100-02.
9. Id. at 3118. In his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (1785),James Madison remonstrated against the incorporation of
religion within the practices of the civil state. He noted that it "degrades
from the equal rank of Citizens" those identified thereby as strangers; it
produces a "tendency to banish our Citizens." Madison, Memorial and
Remonstrance, reprinted in5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 8 (P. Kurland & R.
Lerner ed. 1787). Similarly, in the BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, adopted by the Virginia Assembly following Madison's campaign,
the BILL took care to declare that no one's opinion in matters of religions
"shall in [any] wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities."
Jefferson, A Billfor Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), reprinted in id. at 77. It
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Justice Blackmun correspondingly absorbs that suggestion
within his opinion for himself, Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan.'" Indeed, he incorporates it to decide the case:
Our [decisions subsequent to Lemon v. Kurtzman] fur-

ther have refined the definition of governmental action
that unconstitutionally advances religion. In recent
years, we have paid particularly close attention to
whether the challenged governmental practice either has
the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion ....
Whether the key word is "endorsement," "favoritism," or "promotion," the essential principle remains the
same. The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief or from "making adherence
to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in
the political community."
Although Justice O'Connorjoined the majority opinion in Lynch, she wrote a concurrence that differs in significant respects from the majority opinion. The main
requires no particular sophistication to appreciate the pertinence of these
observations to Justice O'Connor's observations in County of Allegheny.
(Indeed, they were applicable also to Lynch.) See, e.g., Redlich, Nativity Ruling
InsultsJews, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1984, at A19, col. 2; see also Van Alstyne,
What is a Law Respecting "An Establishment of Religion"?, 65 N.C.L. REV. 909,
913-16 (1987).
10. These were, of course, the four dissentingJustices in Lynch. All four
tend to hold fairly strongly to the Madison-Jefferson view of the church-state
clauses of the first amendment. The Chief Justice, Justice White, and now
Justices Scalia and Kennedy (in this respect different from Justice Powell, who
overall came closer to his Virginia intellectual history of Madison and
Jefferson than to the New England view), have pretty well announced a
repudiating of Madison and Jefferson for a preference barely short-if short
at all-of Justice Story's view that our government may affirmatively report
and reflect its judeo-Christian (very small "j," very large "C") founding in its
actions, its laws, its appropriations, and its own internal, official and unofficial
conduct. See, e.g., 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 627-34 (M. Bigelow 5th ed. 1891) (1833) ("[I]t is impossible
for those who believe in the truth of Christianity as a divine revelation to
doubt that it is the especial duty of government to foster and encourage it
among all the citizens and subjects .... The real difficulty lies in ascertaining
the limits to which government may rightfully go in fostering and
encouraging religion. . . . The real object of the amendment was not to
countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, orJudaism, or infidelity
by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects,
and to preVent any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to
a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government.").
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difference is that the concurrence provides a sound analytical framework for evaluating governmental use of religious symbols."
While not framed as Madison or Jefferson would necessarily
have put it, it comes close enough in the end.
II.
In sharp contrast, Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and
for Justices Rehnquist, White, and Scalia, is essentially a pole
widely apart from this view. For Justice Kennedy, the controlling point, so far as the establishment clause is concerned,
seems to be that no one is being religiously coerced (in any
obvious way) or even "proselytized" (in their view) by the state.
Picking up from Chief Justice Burger's earlier opinion in Lynch
v. Donnelly, these Justices, now cast into a momentary dissenting role (insofar as in this case they failed to hold Justice
O'Connor), have no difficulty at all accepting the city's actions
in County of Allegheny. The position they take is bolstered, they
say, by past instances of what they regard as widely accepted
practice. The city's actions thus easily meet the former Chief
Justice's, barrier-clearing, "no more than" test as he had outlined that test in Lynch v. Donnelly."2 Justice Kennedy finds that
that test fits this case quite nicely in the following way:"
11. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3100-02 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly
465 U.S. 668, 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
12. For a critical review and discussion of this "test," see Van Alstyne,
Trends in the Supreme court. Mr.Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v.
Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 782-87.
13. The following quotation reproduced here is reproduced to call
attention to its technique, and not to suggest that the comparisons it offers
are true. Indeed, every example employed to make Marsh look plausible
within existing case law is utterly distinguishable in terms of the opinion
actually discussing that example. Not one comes within a ballpark of Marsh.
Property tax exemption of religiously-held property, in common with such
status for other nonprofit-held property, as was involved in the case actually
decided by the Supreme Court, is not inconsistent with Everson or with the
Madison-Jefferson view; no such thing can be said with respect to taking
money by taxation to pay sectarian ministers conducting prayers agreeable to
the dominant religion(s) of those who thus appropriate money from the
public fisc to hear prayers said. See the strong criticism by Madison of this
practice in his Detached Memoranda (CA. 1817), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITTIoN, supra note 9, at 103. Compare Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970) (especially Justice Harlan's opinion) with Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983). Similarly, Justice Kennedy's comparison of Marsh with
Everson is even more far-fetched. Reimbursement of parents for ordinary bus
fare on the usual municipal transit line on a neutral basis in order for their
children to reach school safely each day, regardless of the nature of the
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[I]n Marsh v. Chambers, we found that Nebraska's practice
of employing a legislative chaplain did not violate the
Establishment Clause, because [in our view] "legislative
prayer present[ed] no more potential for establishment
than the provision of school transportation, beneficial
grants for higher education, or tax exemptions for religious organizations." Non-coercive government action
within the realm of flexible accommodation or passive
acknowledgment of existing symbols does not violate the
Establishment Clause unless it benefits religion in a way
more direct and more substantial than practices that are
accepted in our national heritage.' 4
This passage pretty well absorbs Justice Story's views defacto (if
not quite dejure)."5 It can be best appreciated by fitting it with
the observations offered in explaining the majority position in
Lynch, observations such as they were, by Chief Justice Burger,
on whose Lynch opinion Justice Kennedy firmly relies. So, just
as a brief, comparative flashback to the opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, here is how ChiefJustice Burger similarly found no establishment clause problem with an outdoor park display of a cityowned, compulsory-taxpayer-maintained
sectarian nativity
scene cum Santa Claus, in 1984:
Of course the creche is identified with one religious faith
but no more so than the example we have set out from prior
cases ....16
We can assume, arguendo, that the display advances
religion...; [but] whatever [the] benefit to one faith.. . [,]
display of the creche is no more an advancement or
school each child may attend, involves no tax paid to any religion, to any
church, or to any parochial school. Neither, of course, were the buses owned,
operated, controlled, or governed by any religion or church.

(Compare

Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) with Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977).) The grants sustained in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971), were indeed grants for "higher education," in the Court's view of the
particular case, and for nothing else. Nothing of the sort can be said of

Marsh. When Justice Kennedy speaks of practices that are "accepted" in our
National heritage, id. at 3138, one is entitled to ask, "accepted" by whom?
See, for example, the views ofJefferson on one such "accepted" practice in
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), reprinted
in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 98. As to the "practices"
Justice Kennedy thus identifies as "accepted," note how the proposition is

then slipped sidewise, as it were, leading to judicial approval of still moreand-more-and-more such "practices" as they spill out of government virtually
as from an official church.
14. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3138 (citations omitted).
15.

See supra note 10.

16.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (emphasis added).
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endorsement of religion than the Congressional and
Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself
as "Christ's Mass" . . ..
Prior to this, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that,
[T]o conclude that the primary effect of including the
creche is to advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause would require that we view it as more beneficial to and more an endorsement of religion ... than...
[specific forms of assistance previously allowed such as
textbook loans to parochial schools and bus fare reimbursements, or] more of an endorsement of religion than
the Sunday Closing Laws upheld in McGowan v. Maryland... [or the payment of chaplain salaries sustained in
March v. Chambers]. 8
When it first appeared this way, in Lynch, this "no more
than" test seemed to me to be no help. It moved merely from
one item to another, eliding, adding, and expanding, as it
moved. Indeed, I thought then that it invited immediate flagging,' 9 to try, in that way, to appeal to Justice Powell, and to do
so before the Madison-Jefferson view of the establishment
clause was destroyed, swept away by mass erosion, by the then
Chief Justice who never wanted that view to govern at all. But
the apparent straightfaced manner in which it has appeared
again, this time with two new Justices straightfacedly appearing
to join in, certainly gives one pause. Do the new Justices, Kennedy and Scalia, really mean to proceed in this way? It appears
that both indeed do. Yet, both these Justices are able, wellread, experienced, serious people. Both surely know what they
are about. The more straightforward explanation of what they
are about is that they are drawn far more to Justice Story's leanings than to either Madison or to Jefferson. The "no more
than" test is merely a means of getting from here to there.
One gets there from here by beginning with some seemingly unprepossessing statement of "our national heritage," for
example, a congressionally-enjoined, simple, short, executive
proclamation of national thanksgiving, which no one short of
some crazed atheist is supposed to be capable of finding objectionable.2" After that, what's really different about (a) altering
the motto (to make it theistic), (b) using tax revenues for legis17.

Id. at 683.

18.

Id. 681-82.

19.
20.

See Van Alstyne, supra note 12.
But see Van Alstyne, supra note 12 at 775, for a discussion of

Jefferson's objections as President to such proclamations. See also Gaylor v.
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lative chaplains, or (c) a creche in the courthouse itself, or (d),
(e), (f), (g), and (h)? If one concludes (as one who wants to
easily can, though falsely) that each add-on is no more religiously-endorsing, no more sect-favoring, and/or no more tax-misappropriative than some previous thing, i.e., if one concludes
that the first amendment actually frames a "no more than"
clause rather than a wholly different sort of clause, the game is
obviously up. The "accepted" tradition itself expands. It lays
in its own additional pieces, mosaically, one-by-one. And those
who felt merely trivially uneasy in the "origins" of these "traditions," find themselves ever more marginalized as citizens,
pushed, as it were, to the side.
Of course, to the extent that all along one earnestly
believed that Justice Story's views should have commanded the
judicial interpretation of the first and fourteenth amendments
in the first place, one is not likely to be disturbed. For the
moment, albeit narrowly, we have seen the different tracery of
Madison and Jefferson at work with the Court and especially, or
rather importantly, with Justice O'Connor. The larger question, revisited in the papers Professors Esbeck and Smith have
given us, is whether the Supreme Court ought to confine civil
government to civil restraint and to civil means. In my view, it
surely should, although it cannot succeed without our help.

Reagan, 553 F. Supp. 356 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (a readable and provocative
case).

